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The false friends problem for foreign norm transplantation in developing countries 
 
Abstract 
 
This article investigates the difficulties in transplanting global legal norms into developing 
countries, specifically the problem of ‘false friends.’ This is a linguistics concept describing 
the situation where there is a striking resemblance between two words in two different 
languages, leading speakers of each language to assume, incorrectly, that they understand 
the word’s meaning in the other language.  Even more problematically, the 
misunderstanding is hidden by the assumption of understanding. We argue that similar 
problems can occur when there is a superficial similarity (but a fundamental mismatch) 
between particular global and local norms. We illustrate this through the example of global 
intellectual property regimes and their reception in Vanuatu and Mexico, showing how 
reforms are sometimes welcomed into developing countries on the basis of false 
assumptions that their aims are congruent with existing understandings. Finally, the paper 
develops some policy implications for avoiding the ‘false friends’ problem in a transnational 
legal context. 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper concerns the complex issue of the transplantation of Western statutory 
frameworks into developing countries, as is often required by international or bilateral 
treaty obligations. While these treaty obligations can involve a wide range of subject matter, 
here we explore the issue through the example of the introduction and strengthening of 
intellectual property (IP) legislation in developing countries. As with many other subject 
areas, this routinely involves the transfer of model laws or legislative provisions from 
developed to developing countries to achieve domestic consistency with global standards. 
Even for countries already firmly embedded within the ‘Western’ intellectual-property 
regime, IP or economic agreements can involve the importation of norms that 
fundamentally alter the existing policy regime. There is an emerging body of scholarship 
that is interested in enquiring more deeply into how global norms are actually received in 
practice at a local level, and what is entailed in terms of changed normative understandings 
and practices in receiving countries. To date, this scholarship has focussed mainly on 
human rights, and has often been articulated in terms of questions about how to 
vernacularise and indigenize foreign concepts in ways that make them meaningful to local 
audiences.1 Similar issues around translation have also recently been raised in the fields of 
global legal pluralism and the study of transnational legal orders. In this context it is 
increasingly being recognised that global and local regulatory mechanisms and normative 
orders are often the result of the interaction and contestation between a range of different 
1 Sally E. Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local Justice 
2006; Sally E. Merry, ‘Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle’, in: 108 
American Anthropologist (2006), at p. 38; Daniel Goldstein, ‘Whose Vernacular? Translating Human 
Rights in Local Contexts’ in Mark Goodale (ed), Human Rights at the Crossroads, at p. 111.  
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national, transnational and local bodies, each with a different history of normative 
ordering.2 Both these bodies of literature suggest that processes of transplantation should 
be conceived of as multi-directional and dynamic, as legal concepts are translated and 
localised and rearticulated in an ongoing process. This particular take on norm diffusion is 
in contrast to earlier (and to an extent still existing) understandings about the 
unidirectional, top-down imposition of foreign norms in which issues of communication 
were not seen as a problem. A full elaboration of these approaches, however, requires 
attention to the issues of inter-cultural communication and translation involved in 
processes of transnational lawmaking. 
 
This paper offers some insights for improved inter-cultural communication of legal 
concepts by drawing on the linguistic concept of false friends. These are pairs of words that 
have a similar form and/or pronunciation but different meanings in two languages.3 For 
example, ‘sensible’ in English means being prudent or wise, but ‘sensible’ in French means 
being sensitive. This superficial similarity can lead to the communication of unintentional 
meanings, unless second-language speakers are made aware of the differences in meanings 
between the two words or phrases. The field of linguistics, particularly sociolinguistics, has 
been used by a number of legal scholars to highlight the way in which language and 
discursive practices can serve to perpetuate the domination by majority groups over 
politically marginalised groups, such as women and racial and ethnic minorities.4 By 
engaging with the concept of false friends, we also show how sociolinguistics can also offer 
insights for assisting inter-cultural legal pluralism, particularly given the emerging 
emphasis in this field on translation, interpretation, communication and dialogue.  
 
The inspiration for this paper came when the authors realised they shared the same 
surprising observation from their field sites in Vanuatu and Mexico: in both there is popular 
support for global intellectual property regimes, even where a pure cost/benefit analysis 
would suggest that citizens of these countries should be opposed to such laws, as they are 
likely to hinder access to educational materials, seeds, pharmaceuticals and so forth.5 For 
example, in Mexico, Congress extended the term of copyright to life of the author plus 100 
years in 2003 with virtually no public dissent, despite the cost it would impose on its 
2 Paul Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law beyond Borders 2014; Terence Halliday 
and Gregory Shaffer (eds.), Transnational Legal Orders, 2014.  
3 Yusuf Yaylaci and Arman Argynbayev, ‘English-Russian False Friends in ELT Classes with 
Intercultural Communicative Perspectives’, in: 122 Procedia – Social and Behavioural Sciences, p. 58. 
4 Diana Eades, ‘Legal Recognition of Cultural Differences in Communication: The Case of Robyn Kina’, 
in: 16 Language and Communication (1996), p. 215; Diana Eades, ‘I Don’t Think It’s An Answer to the 
Question: Silencing Aboriginal Witnesses in Court’, in: 29 Language in Society (2000), p. 161. Justin 
Richland, Arguing with Tradition: The Language of Law in Hopi Tribunal Court 2008. 
5 There is considerable literature on the topic of intellectual property and development. See for a 
good overview: Tzen Wong and Graham Dutfield, Intellectual Property and Human Development: 
Current Trends and Future Scenarios 2011; Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2002), 
Integrating Intellectual property rights and development policy 2002, 
http://www.iprcommission.org/graphic/documents/final_report.htm (May 21, 2014). 
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citizens and the negligible benefit it provides to creators. In Vanuatu, a Least Developed 
Country, the introduction of a complete raft of intellectual property laws in 2012 was 
popularly treated as being ‘about time’ despite its likely negative developmental impacts.6 
 
There are many complex reasons why countries sign up to ‘bad’ intellectual property laws 
and why there is sometimes little public debate over them. These include the fact that they 
are often a quid pro quo for access to new markets or favourable trading conditions, the 
secrecy of many economic-treaty negotiations, and the presence or absence of domestic and 
international NGOs working on related issues.7  Beyond these, the linguistic concept of false 
friends offers one further insight into what might be happening in the process of translating 
(or mistranslating) global intellectual property rights concepts locally. For instance, using 
this insight suggests to us that there is a propensity of citizens and leaders in Vanuatu and 
Mexico to view global intellectual property regimes through the lens of their existing 
understandings about rights over intangible culture and knowledge, and therefore make 
assumptions about such regimes that are often not correct. 8  
 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we situate the concept of ‘intellectual property’ as 
an historically contingent, socially constructed means of regulating the production and use 
of knowledge, information and culture.  We then elaborate on the concept of false friends 
and apply it to the cases of Vanuatu and Mexico, showing how understandings about 
entrenched local institutions that regulate the production and use of knowledge have 
affected their interpretation of current IP-reform debates. We conclude with some thoughts 
on the consequences of the false friends concept for transnational legal orders more 
generally. 
 
1. The social construction of intellectual property 
 
In a paradoxical way, intellectual property offers an important site in which to examine 
issues of translation and retranslation of ideas and concepts in a transnational setting. It is 
6 See Miranda Forsyth, ‘The Developmental Ramifications of Vanuatu’s Intellectual Property 
Commitments on Joining the World Trade Organisation’, in: 36 Journal of Pacific Studies (2013) p. 
157. 
7 Susan K. Sell, ‘The rise and rule of a trade-based strategy: Historical institutionalism and the 
international regulation of intellectual property’, in: 17 Review of International Political Economy 
(2010), p. 762. 
8 There are many other reasons for countries introducing intellectual property laws that are 
inconsistent with their level of development, with the largest being pressure from international 
trading partners. However, this pressure cannot account for the phenomenon we are interested in, 
namely where these laws are introduced without any real opposition and even with popular support. 
This awkward empirical reality is often glossed over in the literature on intellectual property and 
development, which tends to portray a polarised debate in which developed countries argue in 
favour of increased intellectual property rights, and developing countries argue against them. See for 
example Hugh Laddie, ‘Foreword’, in CPIR, Integrating Intellectual property rights and development 
policy, 2002, p. v, http://www.cipr.org.uk/graphic/documents/final_report.htm (May 21, 2014). 
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paradoxical because, on the one hand, understandings of what is meant by intellectual 
property (or perhaps, more generally, the regulation of knowledge) today are thoroughly 
dominated by the economics based, Anglo-American approach that is being spread across 
the globe through the mechanism of free trade agreements as discussed below. On the other 
hand, as we show, this is also an area where there are many other competing regulatory 
approaches at national and sub-national levels, although they are often hidden by the 
hegemony of the dominant approach. 
 
Intellectual property is often presented as a western concept that was ‘invented’ with the 
introduction of the English Statute of Anne of 1710 for copyright and emerging from mid-
15th century Vienna in the case of patents, and which has been in development ever since, 
with a real explosion of different types and degrees of protection since the late 20th century. 
However, it is clear from anthropological literature that just about every society throughout 
history has had its own form of intellectual property, in terms of the norms that constrain 
and permit access to knowledge in its manifest forms.9 Indeed, even in societies where real 
property occupies less importance than in the West, rules of access to knowledge are often 
highly developed and underpin the structure of the society and its economy. For example, 
many Pacific Island societies have been operating on the basis of a knowledge economy for 
thousands of years, as knowledge has traditionally been highly prized and closely regulated, 
often far more than tangible resources. In many of these societies, power and prestige are 
closely imbricated with certain bodies of knowledge, such as ritual or medicinal or magical 
knowledge.10 An established Melanesian anthropologist, Lamont Lindstrom,11 has even 
posited a category of ‘knowledge-based’ polity in the region, ‘[w]here men achieve power by 
knowledge alone, control of its production, exchange and consumption is (rather than 
merely serves) political praxis.’ Of course, these different conceptions of intellectual 
property regulation are dynamic and contested, but it can be confidently stated that that the 
way in which indigenous intellectual property regimes operate, the interest groups they 
benefit, and their epistemic and ontological framing, differ considerably from the currently 
dominant Anglo-American, economics-focused property regimes.  
 
9 Rosemary Coombe, ‘Protecting Traditional Environmental Knowledge and New Social movements 
in the Americas: Intellectual Property, Human Rights, or Claims to an Alternative Form of Sustainable 
Development?’, in: 17 Florida Journal of International Law (2005), p. 115; Marilyn Strathern, ‘The 
Patent and the Malanggan’, in: 18 Theory, Culture and Society (2001), p. 1; Eric Hirsch and Marilyn 
Strathern, Transactions and Creations: Property Debates and the Stimulus of Melanesia, 2004, 
Berghahn Books; Haidy Geismar, ‘Copyright in Context: Carvings, Carvers and Commodities in 
Vanuatu’, in: 32 American Ethnologist (2005), p. 437; Ruth Gana, ‘Has Creativity Died in the Third 
World? Some Implications of the Internationalization of Intellectual Property,’ in: 24 Denver Journal 
of International Law and Policy (1995), p. 109. 
10 Simon Harrison, Fracturing Resemblances: Identity and Mimetic Conflict in Melanesia and the West 
2006. 
11 Lamont Lindstrom, ‘Doctor, Lawyer, Wise Man, Priest: Big-Men and Knowledge in Melanesia’, in: 
19 Man, New Series (1984), p. 291, at p. 305. 
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There are also important cleavages within the dominant Western tradition of intellectual 
property. Although already subject to the key global IP treaties, such as the Berne 
Convention (copyright) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS), countries embedded in the Western tradition have their own 
particular balance amongst these different norms and tendencies. Regarding copyright, for 
example, the dominant Anglo-American approach somewhat obscures the Continental 
European approach, the former relatively more concerned with economic remuneration 
and the latter emphasizing copyright (or the author’s right) as an author’s inalienable moral 
right and focusing on  issues such as the maintaining the integrity of creative works.12 While 
all Western copyright regimes contain elements of both of these approaches, they employ 
different logics of legitimatization depending on whether they emerged from the Anglo-
American or Continental traditions – the former stressing economic efficiency for the 
former, the latter human rights – and can lead to significantly different policy focuses. For 
example, when copyrights are traded as an asset, intermediaries such as publishers become 
much more prominent than actual creators, since they are the actors that control the 
majority of economically valuable copyrights (which authors sign over in order to get their 
works published). Given this prominence, the voice and interests of intermediaries can 
supersede those of authors in the policymaking process. The United States, which has been 
the strongest proponent for ever-stronger economic rights in copyright, including 
establishing criminal sanctions for unauthorized copying, is the epitome of a country in the 
Anglo-American tradition. In contrast, as we discuss below, Mexico traditionally hewed 
closer to the Continental European/moral rights side of the equation. 
 
Increasingly, indigenous and local conceptions of intellectual property are coming into 
contact with the dominant Anglo-American, economics-focused approach. In developing 
countries this most usually occurs through the negotiation of economic agreements, 
including free trade agreements (FTAs). Intellectual property rights have become a key part 
of the global trade regime, most prominently with the formation of the WTO in 1995. As 
part of the condition for joining the WTO, members are required to sign up to the TRIPS, 
which mandates minimum standards of intellectual property protection across a range of 
areas including copyright, trademark, patent, industrial design, geographical indications, 
undisclosed information and layout designs of integrated circuits. Other FTAs often require 
countries to sign up to ‘TRIPS Plus’ standards of protection, that go above these minimum 
international standards. In this paper we refer to all of these as ‘global intellectual property 
rights.’  
 
Beyond these treaties, domestic intellectual property laws themselves are extremely 
technical and inaccessible to the layperson. Trade negotiators, politicians, lobby groups and 
the general public are consequently obliged to rely on general narratives about intellectual 
property laws when discussing intellectual-property reform. At this level of generality, such 
12 Reynaldo Urtiaga Escobar, ‘Los sistemas de derechos de autor y copyright hoy’, in: Año II Revista 
Mexicana Del Derecho de Autor Año (2002), p. 11. 
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narratives often rely on pre-existing local understandings about intangible property rights, 
which are used to legitimize any reforms. By the time the disjuncture between the old and 
the new systems becomes apparent, it is often too late to do anything about it – the FTA has 
been signed, the model legislation has been passed, and the changes have taken root.  
 
2. False friends, translation and diffusion 
 
With the constructivist turn in the social sciences, the importance of ideas as a direct 
influence on policymaking is by now widely accepted.13 Social constructivism holds that our 
perception of reality is shaped by our shared ideas about actually existing, material, reality. 
In a socially constructed world, moreover, ideas and meanings are not static; through 
communication, they can be challenged and changed. Of particular interest in the context of 
this paper (and setting the scene for our discussion of the ‘false friends’ phenomenon) are 
two related modes of idea transmission: diffusion and translation. Diffusion is ‘the process 
by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the 
members of a social system’.14 Implied in the concept of diffusion is the existence of an 
‘inside’ and an ‘outside,’ that an innovation – an idea – must go from where it is to a place 
where it is not. In this article, for example, we examine the diffusion of global (and, more 
specifically, market-based) conceptions of intellectual property from the global North 
(especially the United States) to the global South, including to countries already embedded 
in the main IP treaties, but with domestic IP regimes that differ from those of the main IP 
powers. While our specific cases refer to international policy diffusion across national 
borders, policies, concept and ideas can be also be diffused across non-territorial borders. 
Although ‘place’ often refers to geographic entities, particularly countries, it can just as 
easily refer to cultures, issues, or disciplines, as when a musician like Kanye West claims to 
be influenced by ideas and concepts in architecture or high fashion.15 Furthermore, 
policy/ideational diffusion can be more or less voluntary or coercive; more accurately, the 
idea/policy transfer lies ‘along a continuum that runs from lesson-drawing to the direct 
imposition of a program, policy or institutional arrangement on one political system by 
another’.16  
13 E.g., James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in 
Political Life’, in: 78 The American Political Science Review (1984), p. 734; Peter A. Hall and Rosemary 
C.R. Taylor, ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, in: 44 Political Studies (1996), p. 
936; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics 1999; Daniel Béland and Robert H. Cox 
(eds.), Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research 2011; Vivian A. Schmidt, ‘Taking Ideas and 
Discourse Seriously: Explaining Change through Discursive Institutionalism as the Fourth ‘New 
Institutionalism’’, in: 2 European Political Science Review (2010), p. 1. 
14 Johnson and Hagström 2005: 366. 
15 Jesse Serwer, ‘Kanye West: ‘My Next Album Is Going to Be Eight Songs’’, in: Rolling Stone, December 
5, 2013, http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/kanye-west-my-next-album-is-going-to-be-
eight-songs-20131205 
16 David P. Dolowitz and David Marsh, ‘Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in 
Contemporary Policy-Making’, in: 13 Governance: An International Journal of Policy and 
Administration (2000), p. 5-24 
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Translation, meanwhile, refers to the process of adoption and adaptation of new ideas 
diffused across borders, be they geographic, cultural, or disciplinary. In the social world, 
there is no terra nullius. All of our lives are embedded in previously existing institutions 
(defined by Hall and Taylor as ‘the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and 
conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy’17). 
Furthermore, all societies are governed by formal or informal rules addressing basic 
functional requirements of all societies – the distribution and redistribution of material 
wealth, intra- and inter-societal relations, the regulation of knowledge, and so on. This is the 
point made by legal pluralists who stress the rarity of a social field with a single form of 
ordering, and thus the unreality of claims by legal positivists that state law is the only 
relevant site of enquiry.18 It would be highly unusual for a society to have no rules to consult 
in dealing with a situation. Even in novel situations, individuals and groups tend to look for 
analogies in their previous experiences. As a result, when ideas and legal concepts are 
diffused across borders, they must be incorporated – translated – into local ‘practice in 
unique ways that fit with prevailing national political institutions’.19 Merry calls this process 
of reframing ideas within a new cultural framework the process of vernacularisation.20 She 
also draws attention to the role that intermediaries, such as community leaders, activists 
and members of NGOs, play as ‘knowledge brokers’ between culturally distinct social 
worlds.21 
 
Translation of legal concepts is becoming an increasingly important part of transnational 
norm development and global regulation in general. This follows from growing acceptance 
that foreign legal concepts and instruments are rarely simply transplanted from one system 
to another in a neutral manner, but rather are hybridized and reworked. Intermediaries 
who perform legal and conceptual translation work, like language translators, need 
techniques and strategies to assist them, and one such technique that we propose here is 
associated with the concept of false friends. 
 
False friends 
 
As noted above, linguists use the expression ‘false friends’ to describe the situation where 
pairs of words or phrases in two languages look or sound similar, but differ significantly in 
17 Hall and Taylor, ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, at p. 938. 
18 John Griffiths, ‘What is Legal Pluralism’, in: 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism (1986), p. 1; Miranda 
Forsyth, A Bird that Flies with Two Wings: Kastom and State Justice Systems in Vanuatu 2009, 
http://epress.anu.edu.au/kastom_citation.html (May 21, 2014). 
19 John L. Campbell, ‘Ideas, Politics, and Public Policy’, in: 28 Annual Review of Sociology (2002), p. 21, 
at p. 31. 
20 Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence, at p. 1. 
21 Merry, ‘Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism’; see also Holly Wardlow, ‘The Task of the 
HIV Translator: Transforming Global AIDS Knowledge in an Awareness Workshop’, in: 31 Medical 
Anthropology (2012), p. 404. 
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meaning.22 Language learners hear the word in the other language and assume, falsely, that 
they know what it means as it sounds so similar to their own language. The consequences of 
falling into the ‘false friends’ trap range from embarrassment to mutual incomprehension. 
False friends can be particularly treacherous as they are often hidden and the context may 
offer no hint of the fact that the meaning is quite different in the two languages.23 
Awareness of the false friends problem is therefore important in a range of linguistic 
contexts, such as language learning and translation. For example, Yaylaci and Argynbayev 
argue that drawing conscious attention to specific false friends and developing techniques 
and strategies to raise awareness of them ‘can contribute to the development of 
intercultural competence’.24 
 
The false friends concept can be used as a way of revealing the existence of competing 
similar-but-different legal concepts that might otherwise remain hidden. It can be used to 
draw attention to the fact that in some situations, policymakers and the general public 
respond to a ‘foreign’ concept as equivalent to a domestic one without realising the 
fundamental differences between them. For example, the introduction of Western legal 
norms, such as global intellectual property rights, into non-Western settings can lead to 
situations where non-Western policymakers respond to the narrative of intellectual 
property on the basis of their existing understandings about the protection of knowledge. 
They assume that they know what this narrative is all about, because it resonates with 
similar sounding concepts in their own society, and as a consequence may be less 
questioning of its potential disadvantages than they should, and may legitimize harmful 
policies, making them harder to dislodge over time. Drawing attention to this false friend 
problem can allow intermediaries involved in the translation exercise to short-cut any 
misunderstandings that might arise otherwise. 
 
To date, the discourse around the problem of false friends has largely been confined to the 
discipline of linguistics. However, socio-linguists such as Diana Eades have been extending 
linguistic analysis generally into the legal arena.  For instance, her work reveals the 
problems in communication caused by misunderstandings of Aboriginal English in 
Australian Law Courts. She observes that people often assume they are communicating 
when in fact they are not, and that this is particularly problematic when the differences in 
language are not apparent.25 Her work has shown how these misunderstandings can have 
severe consequences, sometimes ending in miscarriages of justice.26 As a result, she holds 
22 Robert Hill, A Dictionary of False Friends 1982. 
23 See Pedro Dominguez and Brigitte Nerlich, ‘False Friends: Their Origins and Semantics in Selected 
Languages’, in: 34 Journal of Pragmatics (2002), p. 1833. 
24 Yaylaci and Argynbayev, English-Russian False Friends in ELT Classes with Intercultural 
Communicative Perspectives’, at p. 64. 
25 Diana Eades, ‘Assuming Communication: Institutional Interactions with Aboriginal People’, 
conference presentation, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia, September 8, 2013. 
26 Diana Eades, Aboriginal Ways of Using English 2013; Eades, ‘I Don’t Think It’s an Answer to the 
Question’; Eades, ‘Legal Recognition of Cultural Differences in Communication’. 
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regular training courses for judges and magistrates in which she urges them to be open to 
the possibility that some expressions used by indigenous Australians may not have the 
same meaning to non-indigenous Australians, even though they are all speaking ‘English’. 
She has succeeded in having the Aboriginal Benchbook for Western Australia require judges 
to draw the jury’s attention to the possibility that sociolinguistic features of an Aboriginal 
witness’ evidence may lead to misunderstandings.27 
 
The problem of false friends has also been incorporated into the development of teaching 
strategies to improve intercultural communication. Yaylaci and Argynbayev explain that 
this is a complex phenomenon, which can be briefly defined as the abilities needed to 
perform effectively and appropriately when interacting with others who are linguistically 
and culturally different. 28 They use Bennett’s model of intercultural communication which 
starts with the denial of the target culture. This denial stage is often the one in which legal 
transplantation occurs as a result of the hegemonic dominance of many dominant global 
legal concepts. The work of scholars such as Merry points towards ways that this denial 
stage can be moved past, by demonstrating the importance of taking cognisance of existing 
local ways of framing concepts and ideas. The other stages of learning intercultural 
communication involve acceptance of cultural difference, and finally, the adaptation stage in 
which ‘the learner effectively participates in the communicative process with the target 
culture by intentionally changing his own behaviour and communication style’.29 Yaylaci 
and Argynbayev argue that false friends tend to slow down the process of intercultural 
communication at all stages, which is why explicit strategies are needed to draw attention 
to them. 
 
Not only leaders and policymakers are vulnerable to the problem of false friends. Its effect is 
general. It influences both elites’ acceptance of massive reform, as well as the public’s 
understanding of policy changes implemented by elites. In the latter case, one might argue 
that this is merely ‘smart politics,’ with politicians cynically selling a revolutionary policy 
reform by framing it in terms of an existing framework. We argue that this is an example of 
deliberately exploiting false friends to deceive the public. The public hears the false friend, 
and is reassured that nothing is changing, even if the politicians selling the change know 
better. 
 
In an attempt to improve intercultural communication about legal concepts, we therefore 
now turn to highlighting the potential false friends problem that exists in intellectual 
property, and show how failure to recognise it affected intellectual property policy in a 
Least Developed Country, Vanuatu, and a key developing country, Mexico.  
 
27 See Stephanie Fryer-Smith, Aboriginal Benchbook for Western Australia Courts 2008. 
28 Yaylaci and Argynbayev, English-Russian False Friends in ELT Classes with Intercultural 
Communicative Perspectives’. 
29 Yaylaci and Argynbayev, English-Russian False Friends in ELT Classes with Intercultural 
Communicative Perspectives’, at p. 61. 
                                                             
 10 
3. But the New Zealanders will have to pay for the bungee jump, right? Vanuatu and 
accession to the World Trade Organization 
 
Vanuatu is a small archipelago located in the area of the Pacific Islands known as Melanesia, 
with a population of roughly 250,000. Previously colonised by both the French and the 
English, it gained independence in 1980. Vanuatu has the formal structures of a nation state, 
with a democratic political system and a legal system based very heavily on its colonial past. 
However, Vanuatu also continues to have vibrant customary governance and legal 
institutions that perform important functions, especially in the rural areas where the vast 
majority of the inhabitants (known as ni-Vanuatu) continue to live as subsistence farmers. 
The relationship between the customary systems and the state is complex and often 
contested.30 As an integral part of this customary system, Vanuatu has well established 
institutions (by which we mean norms and the structures that administer them) regulating 
the production and use of knowledge and intangible cultural property. These institutions 
have their roots in a traditional past, but like all living regulatory systems they continue to 
change, adapting to new local and global circumstances, and responding to political and 
economic struggles between different interest groups.31 Whilst these institutions are 
themselves highly diverse, a number of key features typical of many indigenous intellectual 
property institutions in Vanuatu are discussed through the examples below. 
 
In the Northern islands of Vanuatu, there is a ceremonial ranking system, whereby men, and 
occasionally women, achieve power and prestige by passing through a series of ranked 
grades.32 As part of membership of such grades, participants obtain particular sets of rights 
and privileges, and have access to particular clusters of ritual knowledge not commonly 
known. Although this system has changed (and diminished) considerably over time, it 
continues to be of real importance in establishing legitimacy and prestige for leaders at both 
local and national levels today.33 On Ambrym, one of the Northern islands, one of the sets of 
rights obtained through the graded society is the right to carve vertical slit drums known 
widely as tamtams. These drums have different design faces associated with different ranks, 
and may involve as many as five faces on top of each other. Importantly, the right to carve 
30 See generally Forsyth, ‘A Bird that flies with Two Wings’. 
31 There is a rich body of ethnographic literature that examines rights over intangible cultural 
heritage in Vanuatu and Melanesia more broadly. See for example: Malinowski, Bronislaw 1922, 
Argonauts of the Western Pacific. London: Rutledge and Kegan Paul; Huffman 1996; Lamont 
Lindstrom, ‘Arts of Language and Space, South-East Tanna’, in Jean Bonnemaison et al (eds.), Arts of 
Vanuatu, 1996, p. 123; Strathern, ‘The Patent and the Malanggan’; Simon Harrison, Stealing People’s 
Names: History and Politics in a Sepik River Cosmology 1990. Harrison, ‘Fracturing Resemblances’; 
Steffen Dalsgaard, ‘Claiming Culture: New Definitions and ownership of Cultural Practices in Manus 
Province, Papua New Guinea’, in: 10 The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology (2009), p. 20; Geismar, 
‘Copyright in Context’; and Geismar, Treasured Possessions. 
32 Michael Allen, ‘Rethinking Old Problems: Matriliny, Secret Societies and Political Evolution’, in: 
Michael Allen (ed.), Vanuatu: Politics, Economics and Ritual in Island Melanesia, 1981, p. 9, at p. 24. 
33 For example, many politicians and others with high government positions expend considerable 
resources in gaining new customary titles. 
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these designs is considered to be separate from the ability or skill to do so, meaning that 
carvers may buy the rights to reproduce the design from those who have rights over it as a 
result of their membership of the particular grade.34 These rights are traded through the use 
of ritual currencies of pigs and yams and, increasingly, cash, as tamtams have become 
valuable commodities in the international art market. Geismar states: 
 
 A carver must pay, through various types of ritual practice and, increasingly, with 
money for the rights to both produce (carve) and circulate (sell) kastom images. 
Owners of designs may commission carvers to reproduce them, retaining ownership 
nonetheless . . . Complex relations of patronage, hierarchy, and customary authority 
therefore are embodied in the social form of the ritual complex’.35 
 
Another example of a local intellectual property institution in Vanuatu are the sets of rights 
around the transfer of music. One dimension of this practice is described by 
ethnomusicologist Monika Stern as follows: 
 
In Vanuatu some people are recognised as song specialists, a kind of composer. . . 
. . Maurice, an elderly composer . . . explained to me that, if someone commissions 
a song from him, he composes it and gives it to the person in exchange for a 
payment. The composer himself must forget the song, because, henceforth, it 
belongs to the person who commissioned it. The explanation of the ‘forgetting’ 
composer is very explicit concerning the existence of rights to music. . . . There is 
a close connection between spirit entities and composition. Most of the time, 
people believe that a song or a dance was brought to the living ancestors’ spirits 
in dreams while asleep or walking alone in the bush . . . . This super-natural origin 
of songs is an important part in the conception of rights because it plays a large 
part in the protections of songs ... . Magic ensures that [the rule over payment and 
transfer of rights] is respected.36 
 
Dances are also created and rights over them exchanged in a similar way, the memory of 
which can be transmitted along with a community’s corpus of songs and dances. For 
example, in a recent book describing the dances in Erromango (another island in Vanuatu), 
it is noted that today there are seven women’s dances and three men’s dances that people 
remember. It then notes, ‘In reality, there should be four men’s custom dances but our 
Erromangan ancestors traded one of these dances, the niyeli, with people on Tanna [another 
island]’.37 
 
34 Haidy Geismar, ‘Copyright in Context: Carvings, Carvers and Commodities in Vanuatu’, in 32 
American Ethnologist p. 437 at p. 443. 
35 Geismar, ‘Copyright in Context’, at p. 442. 
36 Monica Stern, ‘Music in Traditional Exchanges in North Vanuatu’ , in: 36 Pacific Studies (2013), p. 
59, at pp. 64-65. 
37 Anna Naupa, Kastom and Culture of Erromango 2011, at p. 38. 
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These brief examples allow us to make a number of observations about Vanuatu’s 
indigenous intellectual property systems. They demonstrate that knowledge and other 
intangibles, such as designs, songs and dances, were and continue to be highly valued and 
able to be traded, with complex rights over their use and transfer. Second, these rights were 
enforced through customary norms and mechanisms, such as demands for compensation, 
war and, importantly, magic or sorcery. Third, indigenous intellectual property is often 
deeply linked to both claims for, and the exercise of, political power. This is particularly 
observed in the first example where we saw that power as obtained through the graded 
system is embodied in particular designs, such as those of the anthropomorphical tamtams. 
Further, the exploitation of these rights and the control they give over important ritual and 
creative practices often enable revenue streams to be consolidated into the hands of the 
most senior and powerful individuals. Geismar observes that ‘the graded societies are a 
prime mechanism for the distribution of entitlement, creating a political economy that 
allocates control over local resources – which range from the prime ritual currency of pigs 
to yams, knowledge and, increasingly, cash – to the highest-ranking men’.38 Stern also 
concludes that ‘knowledge is cultural and economic wealth’,39 and similar observations have 
been made by Lindstrom, who argues that in some societies in Melanesia, power depends 
upon the control of knowledge rather than wealth.40 Finally, rights over intangible valuables 
form a part of the complex exchange system around which social, political and economic life 
in Melanesia was, and to a considerable extent, is still, based.  
 
Unsurprisingly, analogies between these customary understandings of reproductive control 
over designs, and Western notions of intellectual property have been drawn repeatedly by 
anthropologists working in region. Thus Huffman refers to the Vanuatu ‘copyright’ system, 
which ‘recognizes certain individuals, groups or areas as the proper owners of cultural 
items, the rights to which can be purchased, sold and resold over large areas in the 
perpetual spiritual and material drive upwards and outwards towards increased social 
height, prestige, power and influence in the world of the living and the world of the 
ancestral spirits’.41 Lindstrom similarly refers to ‘[t]raditional copyright or patents [that] 
protect valued knowledge, including songs, myths, histories, genealogies and herbal cures, 
as well as artistic motifs carving designs’.42 In the similar context of PNG, anthropologists 
have even debated whether the analogy of copyright or patent is the most applicable to 
certain complexes of rights, such as the Malanggan of New Ireland.43 
 
Similar analogies between Western and indigenous knowledge categories are also 
increasingly being drawn by the ni-Vanuatu themselves and other inhabitants of the Pacific 
38 Geismar, ‘Copyright in Context,’ at pp. 441-442. 
39 Stern, ‘Music in Traditional Exchanges in North Vanuatu’, at p. 71. 
40 Lindstrom, ‘Doctor, Lawyer, Wise Man, Priest’. 
41 Kirk Huffman, ’’Trading, cultural exchange and copyright: important aspects of Vanuatu arts”, in 
Joel Bonnemaison et al (eds.), Arts of Vanuatu, p. 182, at pp. 182-183. 
42 Lindstrom, ‘Arts of Language and Space, South-East Tanna’, at p. 127. 
43 Strathern, ‘The Patent and the Malanggan’. 
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Islands region. Geismar observes ‘the historical emphasis of copyright law on external 
manifestation has given the phrase ‘copyright’ great resonance with communities who are 
interested in protection of the circulation of their cultural knowledge and recognize that the 
complex relationship between knowledge and its materialization is crucial to their own self-
determination’.44 She argues that the term ‘copyright’ has passed into local parlance, and 
has moved beyond being ‘like’ or analogous to indigenous understandings, to have become 
actually incorporated into the way in which rights from the graded society are discussed 
and implemented.45 Geismar’s research finding that ‘nearly everyone’ made explicit linkages 
between copyright and the indigenous intellectual property system46 is consistent with one 
of the co-authors’ own fieldwork, spanning over ten years in Vanuatu. She also found people 
consistently assuming that they know what copyright ‘is’ based on their understandings of 
their indigenous intellectual property system. 
 
Geismar sees these explicit parallels as being empowering for local communities, and 
celebrates the political use that can be made of the appropriation of the international 
language of intellectual property. For example, she demonstrates that Ambrymese men 
have been able to use the language of copyright to assert their rights over tamtam designs 
in a national context to prevent foreigners from trading in such carvings.47 She asserts that 
‘IPR [intellectual property rights] legislation itself is as able to incorporate difference and to 
assimilate diverse understandings of entitlement as it is to be exploited to demonstrate 
geographic and conceptual differences’.48 However, we argue here that there are also 
dangerous and negative consequences of this identification between the two concepts, 
which can be seen through the false friends concept we have described above. In particular, 
this identification risks causing a certain blindness to the fundamental differences between 
the two systems, differences that are heavily weighted through geo-political realities to shift 
the balance of power (and transfer of rents) from the local to the outside world. 
 
The problem of the false friend in the case of Vanuatu can be demonstrated by its recent 
accession to the WTO. Vanuatu inherited a very patchy intellectual property system from 
England upon achieving independence in 1980. A few colonial laws providing for the re-
registration of patents and trademarks were re-enacted, and arguably the Copyright Act 
1956 (UK) theoretically applied.49 However, the system effectively languished, virtually 
44 Geismar, Treasured Possessions, at p. 87. 
45 Geismar, Treasured Possessions, at p. 88. 
46 Geismar, ‘Copyright in Context’, at p. 441. 
47 Geismar, ‘Copyright in Context’. 
48 Geismar, ‘Copyright in Context’, at p. 440. 
49 Section 95(2) of the Constitution provides that English laws of general application continued to 
apply after Independence (in 1980) to the extent that they are not expressly revoked or incompatible 
with the independent status of Vanuatu. The High Court of the New Hebrides Regulation 1976 
provided that the British statutes in force were ‘. . . so far as circumstances admit . . . the statutes of 
general application in force in England on the first day of January 1976’ (Jennifer Corrin-Care, Tess 
Newton Cain and Don Paterson, Introduction to South Pacific Law 1999, at p. 55). 
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unused until interest was reignited by Vanuatu’s first bid to accede to the WTO, which 
began in July 1995 and was withdrawn in 2001.50 As part of this bid, a raft of intellectual 
property laws were drafted, modelled in part on Australian and New Zealand legislation and 
generic UNESCO and WIPO guidelines, but also containing some locally drafted provisions 
on indigenous knowledge and expressions.51 This legislation then remained in limbo for 
over ten years but was finally gazetted in 2011 as part of Vanuatu’s second, and ultimately 
successful, bid to accede to the WTO. 
 
Vanuatu’s intellectual property commitments required to accede to the WTO were 
exceptionally onerous,52 and indeed are the most burdensome of all the Least Developed 
Countries and Small Islands Developing States that joined the WTO in the last ten years.53 
Vanuatu was not permitted to take full advantage of any of the flexibilities that were 
available to it as a Least Developed Country, and it was required to commit to several TRIPS 
Plus provisions.54 There is no doubt that the explanation for the extent of Vanuatu’s ‘bad’ 
intellectual property commitments is complex. It includes the fact that the technical rules of 
intellectual property were likely to have been beyond the capacity of the trade negotiators, 
the pressures that were on Vanuatu to accede from foreign trading partners, and the lack of 
informed and active national lobby groups with understandings of intellectual property. A 
major factor is also likely to be the structural constraints that restrict the bargaining power 
of acceding members. Grynberg and Joy argue: ‘Accession is biased against the applicant 
and the process gives enormous powers to the WTO members to extract concessions that 
would not be possible in a genuinely rule-based system’.55 Despite these structural 
50 Daniel Gay, ‘Vanuatu’s Suspended Accession Bid: Second Thoughts?, World Trade Organisation 
Case Study 43, no date, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case43_e.htm 
(May 21, 2014). 
51 Michael Wright, ‘Traditional Knowledge Protection: International, Regional and National 
Experiences; Legislative Initiatives in Vanuatu to Protect Expressions of Indigenous Culture’, paper 
presented at workshop for Legal Experts on the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and 
Expressions of Culture, Noumea, New Caledonia, 15-19 February 1999, cited in Geismar, Treasured 
Possessions, at p. 78. 
52 The accession package is set out in the WTO Working Party report, Document WT/ACC/VUT/17, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm#vut, (May 21, 2014) 
53 The others were Tonga, Nepal and Cambodia. For example, Vanuatu used the least number of years 
as a transition period, agreed to join UPOV when Nepal and Tonga managed to avoid this, agreed to 
linkage during the transition period when Nepal avoided this, indicated ‘readiness to join’ the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty which Nepal and Cambodia avoided, and the administrative resource 
commitments are more onerous than any of the other countries in that they specify the number of 
officials to be trained, require the establishment of an institution and recruitment of staff, and also 
the obtaining of facilities and equipment. 
54 Such as committing to signing the WIPO Copyright Treaties, becoming a party to UPOV, providing 
for data exclusivity and linkage. 
55Roman Grynberg and Roy Mickey Joy, ‘The Accession of Vanuatu to the WTO. Lessons for the 
Multilateral Trading System’, in: 36 Journal of World Trade (2000), p. 159, at p. 160; see also Joanne 
                                                             
 15 
constraints, other Least Developed Countries acceding around the same time managed to 
avoid certain of the extra commitments that Vanuatu agreed to. For example, Nepal avoided 
committing to high levels of protection over plant varieties, partly on the basis of a strong 
public campaign.56 Consequently, we need to look for other explanations as well. We argue 
that the false friends problem was a meaningful factor in causing ni-Vanuatu negotiators 
and politicians to more readily accept onerous intellectual property commitments. In other 
words, one reason for Vanuatu’s acceptance of high levels of global intellectual property 
was the incorrect assumption that the global system works in a similar way to some of the 
underlying principles of Vanutau’s indigenous intellectual property systems. This can be 
demonstrated by looking at some of the comments made by politicians during the accession 
process. 
 
A constant refrain during the entire decade on which WTO membership was on the table in 
Vanuatu, was that joining the WTO will allow ni-Vanuatu to get financial recognition for 
inventing bungee jumping. The creators of the bungee jump were indeed apparently 
initially inspired by seeing Pentecost Land Diving, in which men jump from high towers 
with vine ropes tied around their ankles.57 However, whereas it is clear that in Vanuatu 
custom that only the people from the island of Pentecost can perform the Land Dive,58 there 
is no western intellectual property right that can be used to make any legal claim over the 
creators of bungee jumping. Nevertheless, the Minister for Trade argued on the radio in 
August 2011: 
 
One of the benefits I think we should have from joining the WTO is to ask some of 
the countries who have copied our practices to have paid us some money. In 
saying this I refer to the land diving on Pentecost, when it was taken by someone 
from New Zealand and then they decided to put up this bungee jump. And I think 
maybe one of the things we join the WTO for … it would give help to us for this 
company to give us some money … .59  
 
Wallis, ''Friendly Islands' in an unfriendly system: examining the process of Tonga's accession to the 
WTO', in: 51 Asia Pacific Viewpoint (2010), p. 262, at p. 270. 
56 Tone Winge, Kamalesh Adhikari and Regine Andersen, ‘Advocacy for Farmers’ Rights in Nepal ’ in 
Regine Andersen and Tone Winge (eds.), Realising Farmers’ Rights to Crop Genetic Resources: Success 
Stories and Best Practices 2013, p. 181. 
57 Miranda Forsyth, ‘Lifting the lid on ‘the community’: Who has the right to control access to 
traditional knowledge and expressions of culture?’, in: 19 International Journal of Cultural Property 
(2012), p. 1, at p. 19. 
58 Margaret Jolly, ‘Kastom as Commodity: The Land Dive as Indigenous Rite and Tourist Spectacle in 
Vanuatu’, in Lamont Lindstrom and Geoffrey White (eds.), Culture, Kastom, Tradition: Developing 
Cultural Policy in Melanesia, 1994, p. 131. 
59 Pacific Beat, ‘Vanuatu Minister warns against delaying WTO membership’, 17 August 2011, Radio 
Australia, http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/onairhighlights/vanuatu-trade-
minister-warns-against-delaying-wto-membership (May 21, 2014). 
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Another example of the confusion in conceptual understanding as a result of the false 
friends problem is the protection of traditional or customary names, such as the names of 
spiritual places or particular ranks of chief. Names are of great importance throughout 
Melanesia, and have their own worth.60 To this day in Vanuatu, if a person wishes to name a 
child after someone then they must present the namesake with a gift (as has happened to 
one of the co-author’s husband and daughter). These customary understandings of the 
importance of respecting rights to names are nowadays often confused with trademark law, 
despite the purpose and operation of the two systems being very different. Consequently, 
one reason put forward by a Member of Parliament in the course of parliamentary debates 
over the introduction of intellectual property law amendments was that intellectual 
property laws are needed to protect ni-Vanuatu names. He stated: ‘If we do not do this, 
anyone, for example in China can use the name Yasur or Nagol and we cannot do anything 
about it, but now an individual from Tanna and Pentecost can register these names’.61 
(Joshua 2011). His argument reflects the fact that under ni-Vanuatu customary law, a non 
ni-Vanuatu would not have any rights over a name associated with a particular Vanuatu 
locality (Yasur is a volcano) or ritual (Nagol is the vernacular name for the Land Dive). 
However, under international trademark law, due to the national treatment principle, there 
can be no discrimination upon the basis of nationality of the applicant. 
 
A final example is the reference in public debates to the need to have intellectual property 
laws to protect the natural resources that are closely intertwined with ni-Vanuatu identity, 
such as kava, yams and traditional medicine. A MP stated ‘Manples [citizens] want to protect 
themselves and the government is putting this system in place to protect our natural 
resources’.62 Under customary law there is a complex system for determining rights over 
genetic resources, which entitle individuals and groups to claim certain rights.63 However, 
under intellectual property laws, particularly patent law, which was the immediate context 
for this debate, natural phenomena and naturally occurring products are not patentable.64 
This point also relates to a further common perception in the area of intellectual property 
policy in developing countries – the tendency to over-value one’s own nation’s (or 
60 For example, Harrison (Stealing People’s Names) describes a society in PNG where names are the 
highest economic currency and the entire political and economic structure of the society revolves 
around their control and transmission.  
61 Jane Joshua, ‘Patents Amendment Bill Isolated from Vanuatu’s Accession to WTO: Kaltongga’, 
Vanuatu Daily Post, 5 December 2011, http://www.dailypost.vu/content/patents-amendment-bill-
isolated-vanuatu%E2%80%99s-accession-wto-kaltongga (May 21, 2014). 
62 Joshua, ‘Patents Amendment Bill Isolated from Vanuatu’s Accession to WTO: Kaltongga’.  
63Miranda Forsyth and Sue Farran, ‘Intellectual Property and Food Security in Least Developed 
Countries’, in: 34 Third World Quarterly (2013), p. 516. 
64 Although of course this boundary is constantly being challenged in new ways. For the moment the 
most authoritative pronouncement is by the US Supreme Court that held in the Myriad genetics case 
that a genetic sequence used as part of a test for breast cancer could not be patentable. The court 
held that a ‘Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery’ is still not enough to constitute 
patentable subject matter. See Association for Molecular Pathology v Myriad Genetics, Inc. 133 US 
2107 (2013). 
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community’s) original contributions to the world, and to minimise the extent to which 
outsiders’ contributions are relied upon. For example, in the debates over the introduction 
of new patent law amendments, an MP argued, ‘it is important and simple – if an indigenous 
ni Vanuatu invents or produces something no one has ever done it has to be protected’.65 At 
no point in the discussion was there reference to the cost that this may entail in terms of 
having to respect the rights of the rest of the world’s inventions. Nor was there 
acknowledgment of the fact that Vanuatu does not currently have a national research and 
development institution, and so the chances of producing a patentable invention are highly 
limited. 
 
A further example comes from a 2013 newspaper report describing a visit by officials to 
Penama Province by Trade Officials.  The report states: 
 
One of the top topics discussed was the Intellectual Property (IP) or Vanipo office. 
The participants and the people of various places visited including Asanvary of south 
Maewo were very interested about the IP and questioned why the office took so long 
to establish. They were very impressed and felt that the office should have been 
established long ago to protect their traditional ways of living, especially the custom 
dances and the artifacts. The general feeling about the establishment of the IP office 
was that it will only encourage innovative and creative ideas (Vanuatu Daily Post 
2013). 
However, there is nothing  in the global intellectual property system to protect traditional 
ways of living.  Nor is it, alone, likely to make a meaningful incentive for innovation and 
creativity, at least in the short to medium term. 
 
This issue of conflicting understandings of ‘intellectual property’ is further muddied by the 
introduction of the traditional knowledge discourse into trade negotiations in high-level 
regional forums, and by WIPO in their awareness raising workshops in developing 
countries. Whether purposively or not, intellectual property and traditional knowledge are 
often discussed together in these forums. However, little attention is given to distinguishing 
the enormous differences in the international treatment of the two areas. Whilst intellectual 
property regimes are part of an established international framework that facilitates their 
enforcement globally through TRIPS and complicated web of FTAs, traditional knowledge is 
not currently protected outside national borders,66 and often not even within them. Dealing 
with the two issues together in FTA negotiations means that these fundamental differences 
are difficult for those not trained in intellectual property to perceive, and there is an implicit 
suggestion of equal treatment. For example, the 2013 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 
Forum Trade Ministers Meeting stated in its Outcome Statement: 
 
65 Joshua, ‘Patents Amendment Bill Isolated from Vanuatu’s Accession to WTO: Kaltongga’. 
66 There is a treaty drafting process in place at the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on 
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore.  
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Ministers highlighted the importance of TK & IP initiatives in preserving and 
securing their culture and arts, and noted the efforts of their Cultural Ministries 
to preserve their culture. The need for the region to become part of an 
international arrangement for the protection of TK and IP was encouraged and 
the respective technical agencies were requested to assist the Members 
accordingly.67 
 
This statement demonstrates the clear connection perceived by many in the region between 
traditional knowledge and intellectual property, and the misguided belief that they are both 
protected at an international level. It also demonstrates the widespread perception that 
global intellectual property laws are valuable in preserving culture, and no discussion about 
any potential disadvantageous development consequences (such as administrative costs, 
limitations in accessing pharmaceuticals, seeds and textbooks).68 
 
4. Mexico: New regime, old justifications 
 
The effect of the false friends problem is most obvious in a situation like Vanuatu’s, where 
there exists a marked contrast between the pre-existing knowledge-regulation regime and 
the intellectual property regime that originated in Europe. As a country with a long history 
of integration into the mainstream of global copyright thought and treaties, Mexico might 
seem to be an odd example to use to demonstrate the concept of false friends. However, we 
argue that the term can also be used to understand changes in intellectual-property regimes 
within the Western world. The concept of ‘intellectual property’ should not be thought of as 
a monolithic, internally consistent thing, but rather as a bundle of norms. Some of these 
norms exist in tension with each other, such as the protection/dissemination paradox:69 
providing protection to knowledge impedes its dissemination by restricting the conditions 
under which it can be shared. Other IP norms have little logical relation to each other (such 
as copyright’s economic and moral rights strains). Specific, actually existing copyright 
regimes differ on how they balance these bundles of norms, according priority to some 
goals (protection and moral rights, say) than others. Changing the relative importance of 
these goals can thus have a significant real effect on a country’s intellectual-property policy, 
even if it remains recognizable as a Western-style “intellectual property” regime. 
 
At heart, the concept of false friends refers to two dissimilar regimes that share a superficial 
resemblance but that possess significant differences underneath the surface. These 
67 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, ‘Forum Trade Ministers Meeting Outcomes Document’ (2013), at 
p. 3. 
http://www.forumsec.org/resources/uploads/attachments/documents/2013_FTMM_Outcomes.pdf 
(May 21, 2014). 
68 See further Forsyth, ‘The Developmental Ramifications of Vanuatu’s Intellectual Property 
Commitments on Joining the World Trade Organisation’. 
69 G. Bruce Doern and Markus Sharaput, Canadian Intellectual Property: The Politics of Innovating 
Institutions and Interests 2000. 
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superficial similarities are used to legitimize the new regime in terms that are more 
appropriate to the old regime. In Mexico’s case, a copyright regime based in the Continental 
European tradition and legitimized by moral rights considerations was effectively 
superseded by an Anglo-American regime, even as it continued to be legitimized largely 
with reference to moral rights.  In Mexican copyright, we can observe the false friends 
phenomenon, albeit on a smaller scale, in the adoption of the 1997 Ley Federal del Derecho 
de Autor (LFDA). This law, which implemented the copyright provisions of the 1994 North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) among Mexico, the United States and Canada,70 
effectively reoriented Mexican copyright policy from its previous Continental European, 
moral-rights focus, to an Anglo-American, economics-rights focus. However, despite this 
substantive reform, Mexican copyright law continues to be legitimated as if it were still 
primarily a moral-rights focused law. 
 
As Viñamata Paschkes notes, and as a cursory reading of the law itself demonstrates, 
Mexican copyright law recognizes both moral and economic rights.71 That said, its moral 
rights are much stronger and more numerous than those found in US law, which served as 
the starting point for Mexico’s NAFTA-derived reforms.72 More importantly from the 
perspective of this article, laws in the two traditions differ in the legitimation strategies 
used to justify copyright and emphasize one aspect over the other.73  
 
Mexico’s initial copyright regime was firmly established in the Continental tradition. Its first 
copyright-style law was Spain’s Real Orden of 1764, which applied to Mexico in its capacity 
as a Spanish colony and which was primarily a censorship law: it provided authors with the 
right to defend their work before it would be banned by the Inquisition Tribunal.74 Like 
other Latin American copyright laws, its later laws were modelled on Spain’s 1879 Ley de 
Propieadad Intelectual (Spain’s own copyright regime was initially based on the French).75 
first copyright-style provisions were incorporated into the Código Civil of 1870, although 
modern Mexican copyright can be dated to Article 28 of the 1917 constitution. The resulting 
law in the Código Civil (1928) established copyright as a privilege granted by the state 
rather than an immaterial property right,76 as in Anglo-American jurisdictions such as the 
United States.  
70 Victor Carlos García Moreno, ‘El Capítulo XVII del TLCAN y su Influencia en la Nueva Ley Mexicana 
del Derecho de Autor’. in Manuel Becerra Ramírez (ed.), Estudios de Derecho Intelectual en Homenaje 
al Profesor David Rangel Medina, p. 103, at p. 103. 
71 Carlos Viñamata Paschkes, La Propiedad Intelectual. 3rd ed. 2005. 
72 For a list and discussion of these moral rights see Viñamata Paschkes, La Propiedad Intelectual, at 
pp. 39-55. 
73 That said, in practice all copyright regimes identified with both traditions incorporate both moral 
and economic rights. 
74 Fernando Serrano Migallón, Marco Jurídico del Derecho de Autor en México, 2nd ed. 2008, at pp. 28-
31. 
75 Viñamata Paschkes, La Propiedad Intelectual, at p. 25. 
76 Viñamata Paschkes, La Propiedad Intelectual, at p. 135. 
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More specifically, its larger objective was to promote public order and the social interest. 
Copyright, in the Mexican tradition, is a tool to promote the educational and cultural 
development of Mexican society, including the promotion of national identity.77 The Ley 
Federal del Derecho de Autor of 1947, the first self-contained copyright law and the first to 
use the term ‘derechos de autor’,78 established, among other things, a copyright directorate 
as part of the Education Ministry (Secretaría de Educación Pública, SEP). The SEP was not 
primarily focused on the market place. Rather, it had as its mandate (among other things): 
 
• the organization, control and maintenance of a literary and artistic property registry; 
• the stimulation of development of theatre in the country and organize contests for 
authors, actors, and set designers, and to promote their general improvement; 
• the organization of artistic exhibitions and other events of cultural interest; 
• the guidance of the artistic, cultural, recreational and sporting activities of the federal 
public sector; and  
• the promotion of film, radio, television and print production.79 
 
The copyright office, meanwhile, was responsible for the application of the LFDA and ‘had 
as objective the protection of author’s rights [copyrights] and to contribute to the 
safeguarding of the nation’s cultural heritage’ (emphasis added).80 This emphasis on culture, 
as well as on moral rights, rather than economics can be seen in Mexican legislation and 
Mexican writings on copyright both before and after the 1997 reforms. The Revista 
Mexicana del Derecho de Autor, INDAUTOR’s predecessor’s in-house academic journal 
features several articles along these lines. In its inaugural edition (January-March 1990), the 
director general of copyrights, Jose Maria Morfin Patraca writes of copyright as ‘the only 
branch of the law that protects the immortality of the human being: that is, its creativity’ 
(author’s translation),81 and that the Mexican juridical tradition in this area establishes 
clearly that Mexico belongs to the school of thought that sees copyright as deriving from 
human rights.’ Elsewhere, scholars write of Mexican copyright’s law’s objective as being the 
77 J. Ramón Obón León, ‘El Orden Público y el Interés social en la nueva ley federal del derecho de 
autor’, in Manuel Becerra Ramírez (ed.), Estudios de Derecho Intelectual en Homenaje al Profesor 
David Rangel Medina, 1998, at p. 121. 
78Serrano Migallón, Marco Jurídico del Derecho de Autor en México, at p. 43. 
79 Viñamata Paschkes, La Propiedad Intelectual, at p. 77. 
80 Viñamata Paschkes, La Propiedad Intelectual, at p. 77. 
81 Jose Maria Morfin Patraca, Presentación por Jose Maria Morfin Patraca, DG del Derecho de Autor, 1 
Revista Mexicana del Derecho de Autor (1990), p. 7, at p. 7. 
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protection of authors’ rights and the safeguarding of the country’s cultural heritage,82 with 
the UN Declaration on Human Rights being a key legitimating document.83 
 
The 1997 copyright reforms that transformed the Mexican copyright regime from one that 
emphasized primarily moral rights to an economics-rights-focused regime were driven by a 
combination of domestic and foreign influences. Domestically, policymakers and 
stakeholders in the late 1980s and early 1990s viewed the existing regime as exhausted and 
in need of ‘modernization.’ This opinion was linked to the general discrediting of the 
country’s statist economic regime in the wake of the debt crisis of the 1980s that plunged 
Latin America into a ‘lost decade’ of zero and negative economic growth. Mexican 
policymakers seized on market-based reforms as the path to salvation, and NAFTA, 
including its Chapter 17 dealing with intellectual property, was their chosen tool to lock in 
these reforms.84  
 
While Mexican policymakers were seeking a new economic model for their regime, both 
NAFTA’s overall policy direction and the specific content of its intellectual property chapter 
(Chapter 17) were driven by the United States. The result was a ‘new regime [that] differs 
markedly from its predecessor. The strong moral-rights orientation of Mexican copyright 
law has been muted and a number of Mexican measures, such as the compulsory licensing 
of translations of works not available in Spanish after seven years, appear to be in conflict 
with NAFTA … ’.85 More generally, Jones claims that ‘NAFTA continues the evolution of 
copyright as a publisher’s right and largely overlooks the author.86 The focus of discussion 
(in NAFTA) is the material object and not the creative subject, a dubious focal point, one 
that gives marketing preeminence and that disenfranchises creation.’ Obón León, 
meanwhile, argues that while previous Mexican law was more in the humanist vein, the 
1997 reforms bear the imprint of neoliberalism, the result of developed countries 
implementing a plan of economic globalization. Where before the law had focused on 
authors/creators, ‘the main concern [of NAFTA Chapter 17] was to protect the recording 
industry, satellite transmissions and the computer industry’ (translation by author).87 Obón 
León further notes (correctly) that the 1997 law’s extension to cover and reinforce the 
82 J. Ramón Obón León, ‘La Actualidad del Derecho de Autor en México,’ Presentation to WIPO 
Conference on ‘El Derecho de Autor: Un Valor Estratégico para el Futuro’, Museo Nacional de 
Antropología e Historia, 28 June 2003, at p. 9. On file with the author. 
83 For example, see Obón León, ‘El Orden Público y el Interés social en la nueva ley federal del 
derecho de autor’, at p. 118. 
84 Stephanie R. Golob, ‘Beyond the Policy Frontier: Canada, Mexico and the Ideological Origins of 
NAFTA’, in: 55 World Politics (2003), p. 361. 
85 Keith Acheson and Christopher J. Maule, ‘Copyright, Contract, the Cultural Industries, and NAFTA,’ 
in Emile G. McAnany, and Kenton T. Wilkinson (eds.), Mass Media and Free Trade: NAFTA and the 
Cultural Industries, 1996, p. 351, at p. 370. 
86 Steve Jones, ‘Mass Communication, Intellectual Property Rights, International Trade, and the 
Popular Music Industry’, in Mass Media and Free Trade, p. 331, at p. 341. 
87 J. Ramón Obón León, Nuevo derecho de los Artistas Intérpretes. 4th ed. 2006, at p. 260. 
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rights held by foreign corporations, performers, phonogram producers, audiovisual 
producers and editors, both foreign and domestic obviates the law’s traditional emphasis on 
protecting the rights of (Mexican) creators and promoting and protecting the development 
of Mexican national culture.88  
 
García Moreno similarly remarks that the 1997 law is more concerned with the rights of 
intermediaries than actual creators, protecting the businesses that profit from authors 
rather than authors themselves. He further argues that the 1997 Act ‘is a law that, rather 
than addressing the authentic needs of Mexican society, is a product of the compromises 
made by Mexico at the international level, especially with respect to the NAFTA … Our 
country had to cede to American pressure to provide ‘adequate’ copyright and neighbouring 
rights protection, for owners and nationals and residents of that country, for purely 
commercial purposes’.89 Where before, he continues, Mexican copyright law had been seen 
as a tool to promote culture and education, the 1997 law transforms it into a commercial 
law that no longer focuses on these humanist objectives. 
 
NAFTA’s de-emphasizing of moral rights in favour of economic rights is also reflected in the 
requirement (rare in international agreements) that the member countries undertake 
specific enforcement measures related to copyright, and its requirement that the three 
NAFTA countries adhere to the Berne Convention except for Article 6bis, which deals with 
moral rights. In contrast, Article 6bis is mentioned in the otherwise similar TRIPS 
Agreement.90 This exclusion ‘represents the clearest indication that [NAFTA] represent[s] a 
further industrialization of culture and are industry-driven. They also represent further 
support for the definition of ‘ownership’ as being vested in producers and manufacturers, 
an outcome of such industrialization’.91  
 
On the former, NAFTA takes the unusual step of requiring that the three countries 
criminalize and penalize commercial copyright violations (Article 1717.1). Mexico was the 
specific target of these provisions, as the United States believed it ‘did not have a 
comprehensive enforcement mechanism for intellectual property’.92  
 
Despite the transformation of Mexican copyright law from a Mexican author-centric tool of 
cultural and national development to an international, owner-focused economic policy, 
88 Obón León, ‘La Actualidad del Derecho de Autor en México’, at p. 11. 
89 Victor Carlos García Moreno, ‘El Capítulo XVII del TLCAN y su Influencia en la Nueva Ley Mexicana 
del Derecho de Autor’, in Estudios de Derecho Intelectual en Homenaje al Profesor David Rangel 
Medina, at pp. 115-116. 
90 García Moreno, ‘El Capítulo XVII del TLCAN y su Influencia en la Nueva Ley Mexicana del Derecho 
de Autor’, at p. 105. 
91 Jones, ‘Mass Communication, Intellectual Property Rights, International Trade, and the Popular 
Music Industry’, at p. 343. 
92 Barry Appleton, Navigating NAFTA: A Concise User’s Guide to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement 1994, at p. 128. 
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Mexican copyright continues to be justified in terms of the old regime. When the LFDA was 
published in 1996 as part of the legislative process, the government framed the reforms as a 
defence of the national culture.93 This focus on the production and preservation of Mexican 
culture is re- stated in article 1 of the 1997 LFDA, according to which, copyright’s objective 
is ‘to safeguard and promote the Nation’s cultural heritage; to protect the rights of authors, 
performers, as well as publishers, producers and broadcasters, in connection to their 
literary or artistic works in all their forms, their publications, their phonograms or video 
recordings, and their broadcasts, as well as other intellectual-property rights’ (translation 
by author). 
 
Copyright’s role in safeguarding the nation’s cultural heritage continues to be raised as an 
issue in the post-NAFTA era.94 Viñamata Paschkes argues that the LFDA’s main subject is 
the protection of ‘intellectual and artistic activity, rather than a commercial interest’.95 
Writing in the introduction to the primary text on Mexican copyright law,96 Kamil Idirs, 
former secretary general of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) remarks 
that copyright is seen in Mexico as the way in which Mexican and universal culture is 
safeguarded and protected.97 According to Serrano Migallón, discussing the post-1997 
copyright regime: 
 
In the past, as today, derecho de autor norms are not just economic or market 
norms; its ultimate purpose has been always of a much more transcendent nature, 
its juridical norms destined to preserve the dignity of the labours of creators of 
these works of ingenuity and the spirit, in a way that allows, regarding respect 
and remuneration, an apt environment for creation and its enjoyment (author’s 
translation).98 
 
Among those lawyers working on copyright there is a recognition of this cognitive 
dissonance, that an economic law continues to be justified in terms of moral rights. As 
copyright lawyer Manuel Morante remarked in an interview with the co-author99, ‘Today 
the derecho patrimonial (economic right) takes precedence over moral rights.’ However, as 
copyright lawyer and scholar (from the National Autonomous University of Mexico, UNAM) 
93 Obón Léon, ‘El Orden Público y el Interés social en la nueva ley federal del derecho de autor’, at p. 
123. 
94 E.g., Gabriela Barrios Garrido, ‘Internet y lo que falta en la nueva Ley Federal del Derecho de Autor’, 
in Estudios de Derecho Intelectual en Homenaje al Profesor David Rangel Medina, at p. 354, 
http://www.bibliojuridica.org/libros/1/164/21.pdf (May 21, 2014), discussing discussing 
copyright’s role in the digital era. 
95 Viñamata Paschkes, La Propiedad Intelectual, at pp. 79-80. 
96 Serrano Migallón, Marco Jurídico del Derecho de Autor en México. 
97 Kamil Idirs, ‘Preface’, in Fernando Serrano Migallón, Marco Jurídico del Derecho de Autor en México. 
98 Serrano Migallón, Marco Jurídico del Derecho de Autor en México, at p. 4. 
99 Manuel Morante Soria. Copyright Lawyer, Arochi, Marroquín & Linder, S.C. Interview by co-author. 
Mexico City. December 3, 2009. 
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Cesar Callejas also noted in an interview with the author, ‘In Mexico there is still the myth 
that industrial property protects commerce and derecho de autor protects artistic ideas 
(moral rights).’100 
 
In Mexico, therefore, we have a situation where significant copyright reforms were 
undertaken, transforming the moral-rights-focused regime into a markedly different 
economic-rights-focused one. However, it continues to be justified and legitimized in terms 
of a moral-rights regime that, while not completely eliminated, has been roundly 
subordinated to what is now primarily a commercial law. This justification, in terms of a 
regime that no longer exists, complicates the ability to have a clear discussion of the merits 
and drawbacks of the new regime. Especially when the public is increasingly being directly 
affected by copyright law, thanks to the spread of digital technology and file sharing,101 an 
understanding of the actual purposes and effects of copyright and IP is crucial to a well-
informed policy discussion.  
 
5. The Perils of False Friends 
 
In this conclusion we reflect on the false friends concept at three different levels of 
generality. 
 
At its most general level, the concept of false friends demonstrates the value that 
sociolinguistics can bring to the difficult and contested terrain of translating legal concepts. 
Although attention has been paid to the value of sociolinguistics in a legal context, it has 
mostly been at the level of courtroom interactions.102 However, given the recent emphasis 
on translation as part of the growing awareness of the dynamics of pluralism in 
transnational legal ordering, sociolinguistic insights may also prove important in a 
transnational context. For example, sociolinguistics offers important insights into the way 
discursive practices constrain the ways in which concepts are able to be framed, and also 
how they perpetuate certain types of domination.  
 
At a second level, we suggest that the concept of false friends may be a useful device for 
facilitating intercultural legal pluralism generally. It draws attention to situations where 
there is a superficial similarity between concepts, meaning that the problems of 
miscommunication are not readily apparent. It is highly likely that this is a far more 
frequent problem than the paucity of the literature suggests, especially perhaps in countries 
where a pidgin or creole is spoken and the necessity for translators is therefore often not 
considered necessary. For example, in discussing the Bislama (pidgin English spoken in 
Vanuatu) concept of human rights, Taylor states:  
100 Cesar Benedicto Callejas. Director, Patents and Trademarks; National Autonomous University of 
Mexico (UNAM). Interview by co-author. Mexico City. October 26, 2009. 
101 See Blayne Haggart, Copyfight: The global politics of digital copyright reform 2014. 
102 Justin Richland, Arguing with Tradition: The Language of Law in Hopi Tribunal Court 2008, at pp. 
61-62. 
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In particular, . . . the concept of raet in Bislama does not easily equate to the apparently 
naturalised terms of Western notions of liberal democracy and individual equality 
that are implied in the ‘rights’ of ‘human rights’. Rather, related as it is to privileges of 
status that are acquired through ritual and other social mechanisms, it is primarily 
understood to be relational and hierarchical. To have raet is to hold the power to 
‘overem’ (‘to go over’) others; the power to assert one’s dominance and impose one’s 
will over others . . .  Within this schema therefore, ipso fucto, one group or person’s 
‘freedoms’ imply another person’s ‘penalties.’103 
 
However, while the consequences and likelihood of a false friends problem increase with 
the distance between regimes, they are likely to be present even in similar regimes. Looking 
at our two cases, Vanuatu’s regime is obviously more different from the global IP regime 
than Mexico’s is from the United States. Adopting wholesale a WTO-style IP regime will 
fundamentally change how Vanuatu can manage knowledge. In contrast, NAFTA shifted the 
orientation and emphasis of Mexican copyright policy, but did not completely transform it 
because the Mexican copyright regime already addressed both economic and moral rights in 
the European tradition(s). Nevertheless, that the Mexican regime continued to be justified 
in terms of the language of the previously existing regime is evidence of a false friends 
effect: a ‘new’ policy welcomed based on the language of the old. 
 
Finally, at its most specific level, this paper has highlighted two particular instances of false 
friends in the context of intellectual property. Just as good second language teachers have a 
certain set of false friends that they warn language learners about, so we have started the 
process here of identifying specific false friends that can occur at a conceptual legal level 
arising from superficial similarities over the regulation of knowledge and other intangible 
valuables. This identification of the false friends problem is of assistance in a number of 
ways. First, it suggests that there is a need for a mechanism to correct the false ‘translation,’ 
to avoid IP maximalist policies being unquestioningly introduced in some developing 
countries, and to help citizens understand the real potential pitfalls and opportunities of the 
new legal regimes. This translation can be performed by a range of intermediaries, such as 
national IP office staff, or northern activists working to convince developing countries not 
to sign ‘bad’ IP agreements. Often such activists will assume that the population will be 
opposed to such laws, and may not be aware of the education and explanation that needs to 
be done up front to ensure that there is mutual understanding about the issues at stake.  
 
The existence of the false friends problem also raises real questions about actors’ full 
agency and self-determination over domestic intellectual property policy in developing 
countries. False friends create blind spots in which one is unaware that there is even a 
problem – the issue of ‘known unknowns,’ to quote an infamous former American Secretary 
103 Jack Taylor, ‘The Social life of Rights: Gender Antagonism, Modernity and rate in Vanuatu’, in: 19 
The Australian Journal of Anthropology (2008 ), p. 165, at p. 176. 
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of Defence. They are likely to exacerbate the power disparities between the global IP 
powers and Least Developed Countries like Vanuatu and developing countries like Mexico, 
since it is hard to know that you (policymakers or the general public) are striking a ‘bad’ 
deal – or, more precisely, a deal that does not do what you think it will do – if you do not 
fully understand the terms being discussed. While this is obviously a problem for 
developing countries, it should also be of concern to international organizations like the 
World Intellectual Property Organisation and the WTO, as well as the global IP powers. The 
long-term sustainability of the global (Western) IP regime requires that it be seen as 
legitimate and fair to all those involved. False friends, and the advantages they provide to 
more powerful countries and organizations, strike at the heart of the legitimacy of these 
agreements.  
 
Looking to the approach taken by Diana Eades regarding Aboriginal English in Australian 
courts, we argue that similar directions and translation mechanisms are required in the 
context of information sessions about, negotiations over, and implementation of, global 
regulatory orders such as global intellectual property regimes. In the absence of awareness 
of such fundamentally different discursive frameworks, it is virtually impossible to have the 
sort of robust debates that are necessary for developing countries to engage with the 
advantages and disadvantages of the global legal norms on offer. Addressing the issue of 
false friends is not a panacea for the structural imbalances between countries negotiating 
on intellectual property, or other issues. The problem of coercion, through political or 
economic pressure, such as via FTAs will likely continue. However, it is preferable, as a 
fundamental principle of justice, that there is at least awareness at a political and grass-
roots level of the extent of the trade-off that has been made.  
 
